One conference took place in thẽ nation's mass media; the other took place on the floor of the Wellington To· wn Hall. The differences between thẽ two conferences were striking and instructive. A few examples should illustrate this:
in the "mẽdia conference", the culmination of this campaign, and the living symbol of this intensely divided conference, was the "moderates'" attempt to censure the FOL leadership for its participation in thẽ lOth World Trade Union Congress in Cuba earlier this year; in the ' "Town Hall conference", fully 74 percent of votes cast supported the existing FÕL policy that encourages participation in such conferences.
in the ' "media conference", the FOL leadership rode roughshod over delegates, and on the last day suppressed open debate by restricting the time available for discussion of remits, and limiting debate to two speakers for and against each remit; in the "Town Hall conference" an almost day-long debate on the wagẽ/tax trade-off, and a half-day debate on unẽmployment featured numerous delegates, many granted extensions of time, speaking on all aspects of the two issues; on the last day of the "Town Hall conference", delegates spent almost six hours discussing the .differẽnt recommendations on remits brought down by the Remit Committees, in many cases taking the opportunity to discuss yet again issues already raised in debate on the President's and Secretary's Rẽports. in the "media conference", the third day was dull and uneventful, highlighted only by a fiery exchange on the affairs of the Wellington Boilertnaker's Society; on the third day of the "Town Hall conference", delegates had been left drained by a passionate half.-day debate on unemployment that culminated in a dramatic address by an unemployed worker representative that was received in an uncanny and emotion-filled silence by the 384 delegates present.
The two conferences -the "media conference" and the "Town Hall conferẽnce" proceeded side by side, sometimes touching each other, but always liable to veer off in * Lecturer, Industrial Relations Centre, Victoria University of Wellington.
78 PatWalsh remarkably different directions. There are several reasona for this. One of the mOlt important of these is the nature of the media's conception and understanding of industrial relations. The media choose to characterize industrial relations as being about conflict. Not only is conflict a highly marketable commodity but the upon it often makes easier the job of a reporter charged with the daunting)y complex task of condensing a complicated industrial issue into two columns of print or three minutes of air-time.
Very often, of course, this emphasis upon conflict is quite appropriate since most of the key issues in the union/employer relationship do involve conflict. But when carried over to the reporting of a trade union conference, this strea upon conffict is Ukely to be more inaccurate than accurate. At a union conference most of the delegates are on the same side most of the time. This is not to deny the importance of conflict within trade unions. Such conflict has been a major source of change, both positive and negative, in the development of the New Zealand trade union movement and there certainly was conflict at the 1982 FOL Conference, but it was of a minor nature. The minority faction never commanded the support of more than one-quarter of delegates, and even then, their conflict with the great majority of delegates was focuaed on a small number of issues.
Despite this, the media searched endlessly for conflict: television cameras rolled on cue whenever a member of the minority faction approached the microphone; a "Checkpoint" radio interviewer plaintively asked her reporter -"Can we hope for any fueworks tomorrow?"; and following the conference, television's "Close-up" gave detailed and sympathetic coverage to the strategies of the minority faction. In fact, however, the great bulk of delegates' time and energies at the 1982 FOL conference was taken up with issues that expressed their united opposition to their common enemies -their employers and the government. But the dominant impression gained from the media was of a significantly and bitterly divided conference. This was a myth -a myth born of the media's quenchless preoccupation with conflict. Out of this preoccupation emerged the two conferences -"media conference" and ''Town Hall conference" -myth and reality in industrial relations.
•
The Town Hall Conference
The 1982 FOL conference will be rementbered primarily for the debate over the Government's proposal for a wage/tax trade-off. This was the reality of the conference -a trade union movement giving consideration to a political and economic issue of enonnous significance. The nature of this debate, and what it tells us about the New Zealand trade union movement ensures that the 1982 FOL conference will be of enduring importance for industrial relations in New Zealand.
A wage/tax' trade-off is a fon11 of incomes policy and, as such, continues the recent tradition of incomes policies in New Zealand that began with the Stabilisation of Remuneration Act in 1971. But in one vital respect, the Government's policy in this case has differed from previous incomes policies. Those policies rarely, if ever, involved any significant degree of consultation by government with trade unions and employers. Instead, they were introduced by unllateral government action. It has been argued that this lack of consultation was an important reason for their failure and that the incomes policies of the 1970s foundered on union and employer resistance. The degree of consultation involved in the proposal for a wage/tax trade-off constitutes a recognition by government that it is no longer desirable to try to enforce incomes policies unilaterally. For the fust time a New Zealand government had proposed a social contract.
But overseas experience has shown that social contracts pose their own particular problems. Where they have been introduced by agreement between government and union and etltployer elites without any consultation with their membership, especially union membership, they have encountered major problems through this lack of membership commitment. These elite agreeJJtents have also provoked deep divisions within trade union movements through membership hostility to union leaders whom they regard as having sold them out. 'fhe detertnination of the FOL leadership to submit theGovernment's proposal for a social contract -the wage/tax trade-off -to its annual conference constitutes an effort to forestall these problems.
Thus, the conference debate, as much as the decision to reject the proposal, was of great significance for industrial relations in New Zẽaland. It represented the first active involvement by trade unions in the introduction of an incomes policy; and it representẽd an awarẽness by trade union leadership, that in the absenoe of membership approval, their own consent to theGovernment'sproposal would be counter-productive. For these reasons, the conferẽnce debate and the reasons why union delegates overwhelmingly reJected the proposal warrant close scrutiny.
The Debate
The wage/tax trade-off debate occupied most of the second day of the conference.
FÕL economist Alf Kirk, spokẽ to a seventeen-page paper for more than an hour, and then answered delegate's questions. Kirk frrst examined the Government's proposal in isolation from other factors. He noted that in general, a trade-off based upon a higher tax-cut offered more benẽfits to lower-paid workers. Assuming a $7 per week tax cut (the approximate mid-point of the two extremes of the Government's proposal) Kirk showed tl1at 70 percent of workers would benefit, and 30 percent would lose from the Government's proposal. However, the net benefits would not be large for each individual worker. At tl1e average wage ($14,700) the net weekly gain would be 84 cents. (For a $5 tax cut the average wage-earner would gain 58 cents, wl1ile for a $10 tax cut the weekly gain would be $1.10.)
Thus, the money-wage gain for ẽacl1 worker would be small, but if thẽ wage/tax tradeoff significantly reduced inflation, as tl1e Government claimed, then the real wage gain would be greater. However, Kirk showed that the impact of the trade-off upon inflation would be minor, and that even this minor impact is not assurẽd. With a $7 per week tax cut, the trade-off leads to an overall reduction in wage settlements of 4.2 percent. Using the Government Statistician's calculation that one-tltird of each percentage increase in inflation stems from each single percentage increase in wages, he pointed out that a wage settlement reduction of 4.2 percent will only reduce inflation by 1.4 percẽnt. But even this modest reduction is far from assurẽd since it depends upon tl1e wage settlement reductions being reflected in a slower rate of price increases. There is no forn1al mechanism in the Government's proposal to ensure that this actually happens. A rẽlated issue, noted by Kirk, is that those who derive their incomẽ from souroes other than negotiated wage agrẽements also benefit from the tax reduction, but make no trade-off by a reduction in income. In effect thẽy win twice.
Kirk emphasized that the trade-off cannot be considered in isolation from other factors. The Government's proposal would reduce Government revenue by something between $300 million and $700 million. ' This reduction could lead to one of the three outcomes:
(1) The Government may fmance the cut in personal income tax by increased indirect taxation. This would hurt lower-paid workers who spend proportionally more of their income and would incur more sales tax. (2) Tl1e Government could finance the cuts in tax revenue by reducing its spending on healtl1, education and welfare, and other government services that ben. efit workẽrs. In this case workers are worse off because the provision of government services is reduced, and thẽ social wage is lov.lered. It also increases unenlployment. (3) The revenue cuts could be fmanced by increased government borrowing. This generates inflationary pressures that erode real wages and leave workers worse off. Tl1us, Kirk concluded, the trade-off is a fonn of "supplementary minimum prices" for employersa government subsidy on the wages they pay wl1ich is financed either out of taxes paid by workers, or by government borrowing.
Kirk went on to consider the trade-off in relation to proposals for tax reform, and to evaluate the impact of possible tax reform on the distribution of gains and losses. He examined the "most likely " of tax reform, involving a raising of the income levels which different marginal tax rates take effect. In this , the 35 percent nwginal rate would apply to income between $5,500 and $16,000, a 48 percent rate to &&&"'''••· between ·$16,001 and $22,000, and a 55 percent rate on income between $22,001 -&· $32,000. Using again the example of a $7 per week tax cut, the proportion of workers would then benefit from the trade-off is reduced from 70 percent to SO percent. In case the average wage-earner now loses 70 cents a week. AJ weD u this, he pointed out further unfavourable effect. The pressure for lov.er marginal tax rates would be because total tax paid is lower with the trade-off in effect. This would leave in place current distribution of the tax burden which has shifted progressively onto workers in last decade.
Kirk fmished by relating these economic arguments to political and industrial ---....... "-rg_ tions. He pointed out that should the conference reject the proposal, theGovemment would almost certainly enforce it by legislating for wage controls and the trade-off proposed, and would break off union discussions with Government on wider issues, including fJSCal policy. He stated that delegates must decide: (a) whether the economic costs he had outlined would in fact be incurred if the proposal was accepted; and (b) if so, whether these costs were worth incwring in order to avoid the consequences of rejection.
Kirk was followed by David Thorp, Chain11an of the Combined State Unions, who read out the CSlrs decision to reject the trade-off in its present for1n -particularly in the absence of any forntal mechanistn to preserve government services. In the ensuing debate there was general acceptance of Kirk's economic arguments.
By mid-afternoon a consensus had emerged that the costs of approval were unacceptable. Indeed delegates felt that they were so obviously unacceptable that the Government could not seriously have expected approval. This led them to consider whether the Government actually hoped for rejection so as to provide a stick with which to beat the unions in a possible snap election. A tentative suggestion that if this was the case, the conference should vote for conditional acceptance was however received negatively. Delegates pointed out that the proposal had to be considered on its merits, and that they could not be drawn into speculation over the Government's electoral strategy.
Debate moved to consideration of the implications of rejection. It was generally accepted that rejection would lead to legislated wage controls, including the trade-off. A consensus emerged that this would have to be tolerated as a price of rejection. Delegates argued that they could not be seen to have accepted a proposal which was so demonstrably unfair to their members. On the other hand, the injustice of wage controls could mobilize the membership into enhanced commitment and active support for the union movement's resistance to the legislation. There was also a feeling that wage controls had proven ineffective in the past, and might prove similarly ineffective again. Delegates seemed to feel that acceptance damned them to hell, while rejection damned them to purgatory. Thus, rejection offered at least the long-te11n hope of salvation. The Executive's motion was moved by the President, Jim Knox. It rejected the proposal and called for a campaign of action to resist the trade-off. (See appendix for full text.) The executive motion was passed almost unanimously and the wage/tax trade-off was rejected.
Other Issues
Despite the fundamental importance of the wage/tax trade-off proposal, delegates were inevitably concerned with a wide range of other issues. Not surprisingly, in view of the current economic crisis, the trade union movement showed itself to be preoccupied with fundamental economic issues. As noted eulier, delegates spent almost a half-day explicitly debating the issue of unemployment, which was also a recurring theme in other discussions. A motion that all affiliated unions should contribute one percent of their revenues to assistance for the unemployed, through their Trades Council was passed unanimously. It appeared that New Zealand's trade unions had taken to heart the costly lessons learnt in the 1930s when splits developed between the Unemployed Workers' Movement and the (numerically smaller) trade union movement. The conference also endorsed a remit opposing the Government's industry restructuring programme, and expressed its opposition to CER as serving the interests of monopolies and multinationals. Concern was expressed at thẽ lack of available information about CER, and the representative from the Australian Council of Trade Unions assured delegates that the ACTU would pass on infortrtation made available to it by the Australian Government, but withheld from the FOL by the New Zealand Government. The conference again endorsed the F' OL's Alternativẽ Economic Strategy, and urged that Trades Councils and their affiliates become more actively involved in this. Other basic economic issues such as the cost of living, the minimum living wage, youth rates, and redundancy were also widely discussed.
It was predictẽd in some quarters that international affairs would genẽrate considerable controversy. However, with regard to the key question of FOL attendance at World Federation of Trade Union (WFTU) conferences the right-wing faction led by Neary (North Island Elẽctrical Workers) and Trott (Harbour Boards Workers) were in a clear minority. Trott himself had to bear a stinging attack from Meatworkers' secrẽtary Blue Kennedy for his role in organizing the anti-union faction at Oringi. It is probable that this did not help the cause of the right-wing.
The Chile trade ban issue was resolved, with President Jim Knox being instructed by tl1e conference to take up the question with tl1e International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and to lift the ban if this seems appropriate. It appeared that this was a face-saving compromise that could be accepted by all sides. Once it became clear that the key unions involved in enforcing the ban were opposed to its continuation, then the likelihood of such a compromise fo11nula was high. The Polish issue received considerable attention, but again, did not create great controversy. The conference accepted the Policy Committeẽ's recommendation to delete a reference in tl1e Electrical Workers' remit to the Polish military being "directed" by the Soviet Union, and to witl1draw a call in the Watersiders' rẽmit for a national day of protest to support the Polish workers. The conference reaffirn1ed its opposition to nuclear arms and nuclear testing, and endorsed the principle of a Pacific Trade Union Forum. Delegates also condemned the 1981 Springbok Tour, and congratulated the protest organisers and participants as constituting "thẽ largest and most representative movement of ilie people of this country ever seen".
Two notable concerns of thẽ conference were witl1 the issues of trade union ẽducation and membership mobilization. The increasing priority given to these concerns appears to reflect the new directions being brought about by thẽ Knox/Douglas leadership. In his Presidential Address, Knox argued that: ''Central to the development of the trade union movement at the present time is thẽ need for a co-ordinated strategy of trade union education". He categorized the need to build up grassroots organization as tl1e "most important" policy issue currently facing the trade union movement. These concerns were also prominent in the wage/tax trade-off debate, particularly in the motion wltich rejected thẽ trade-off. This motion called for a general campaign of action both to resist the trade-off and to prẽss for the minimum living wage, based upon a programme of trade union education and membership mobilization. Delegates stressed the nẽed to explain the reasons for rejection to the membership, and to ensure that the membership was mobilized to support that rejection. It would appear that these changes, stimulated by the new leadership, are associated with a realization that New , Zealand's unions can no longer shelter behind the arbitration system, but must rely upon their own resources.
There · were eight candidates for four Executive positions. Despite speculation that key unions would withdraw their support for Bill Andersen (Northern Drivers), he was comfortably reelected. The other sitting candidates were also easily reelected -Ernie Ball (Engineers), Ashley Russ (Carpenters) and Wes Cameron (Meatworkers). The issue of Labour Party/trade union links was not prominent at the conference. Despite his statements criticizing the nature of the relationship, Bill Rawling was received about as warn1ly as a Labour Party leader could expect to be after three successive electoral defeats. Rowling raised the issue of union/party links, but this did not seem to provoke any great 
Conclusion
Despite media myths, the 1982 FOL Conference. revealed the existence of a considerable measure of unity with;n the trade union movement. Dissent was largely restricted to a minority faction led by the North Island Electrical Workers. However, it appears that they felt strongly enough about the issue of FOL links to the WFTU to persuade them to consider withdrawal from the FOL at their 1983 conference. The heated debates that occurred over a number of issues appeared to demonstrate the vitality of the union movement more than the exist~nce of fundamental divisions. For the most part, delegates shared a common perception of the issues confronting New Zealand's trade union movement. This was that current Government poHcy seems systematically to shift the burden of the depression onto the shoulders of the workers. In these circumstances, trade union movements always tend to close ranks and to concentrate on fundamental economic issues in an effort to respond to these developments. This conference was no exception.
